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   Abstract  Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is an emerging 
technology that shows great promise for various futuristic 
applications both for mass public and military. The sensing 
technology combined with processing power and wireless 
communication makes it lucrative for being exploited in 
abundance in future.  The inclusion of wireless communication 
technology also incurs various types of security threats. The 
intent of this paper is to investigate the security related issues 
and challenges in wireless sensor networks. We identify the 
security threats, review proposed security mechanisms for 
wireless sensor networks.  We also discuss the holistic view of 
security for ensuring layered and robust security in wireless 
sensor networks. 
 
   Keywords  Sensor, Security, Attack, Holistic, Challenge. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
   Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are emerging as both an 
important new tier in the IT ecosystem and a rich domain of 
active research involving hardware and system design, 
networking, distributed algorithms, programming models, 
data management, security and social factors [1], [2], [3]. The 
basic idea of sensor network is to disperse tiny sensing 
devices; which are capable of sensing some changes of 
incidents/parameters and communicating with other devices, 
over a specific geographic area for some specific purposes like 
target tracking, surveillance, environmental monitoring etc. 
Today’s sensors can monitor temperature, pressure, humidity, 
soil makeup, vehicular movement, noise levels, lighting 
conditions, the presence or absence of certain kinds of objects 
or substances, mechanical stress levels on attached objects, 
and other properties [4].  In case of wireless sensor network, 
the communication among the sensors is done using wireless 
transceivers. The attractive features of the wireless sensor 
networks attracted many researchers to work on various issues 
related to these types of networks. However, while the routing 
strategies and wireless sensor network modeling are getting 
much preference, the security issues are yet to receive 
extensive focus. In this paper, we explore the security issues 
and challenges for next generation wireless sensor networks 
and discuss the crucial parameters that require extensive 
investigations. 
   Basically the major challenge for employing any efficient 
security scheme in wireless sensor networks is created by the 
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size of sensors, consequently the processing power, memory 
and type of tasks expected from the sensors. We discuss these 
issues and challenges in this paper. To address the critical 
security issues in wireless sensor networks we talk about 
cryptography, steganography and other basics of network 
security and their applicability in Section 2. We explore 
various types of threats and attacks against wireless sensor 
network in Section 3. Section 4 reviews the related works and 
proposed schemes concerning security in WSN and also 
introduces the view of holistic security in WSN. Finally 
Section 5 concludes the paper delineating the research 
challenges and future trends toward the research in wireless 
sensor network security. 
 
2. Feasibility of Basic Security Schemes in Wireless 
Sensor Networks 
 
   Security is a broadly used term encompassing the 
characteristics of authentication, integrity, privacy, 
nonrepudiation, and anti-playback [5]. The more the 
dependency on the information provided by the networks has 
been increased, the more the risk of secure transmission of 
information over the networks has increased.  For the secure 
transmission of various types of information over networks, 
several cryptographic, steganographic and other techniques 
are used which are well known. In this section, we discuss the 
network security fundamentals and how the techniques are 
meant for wireless sensor networks. 
 
2.1 Cryptography 
 
   The encryption-decryption techniques devised for the 
traditional wired networks are not feasible to be applied 
directly for the wireless networks and in particular for wireless 
sensor networks. WSNs consist of tiny sensors which really 
suffer from the lack of processing, memory and battery power 
[6], [7], [8], [9]. Applying any encryption scheme requires 
transmission of extra bits, hence extra processing, memory 
and battery power which are very important resources for the 
sensors’ longevity. Applying the security mechanisms such as 
encryption could also increase delay, jitter and packet loss in 
wireless sensor networks [10].  Moreover, some critical 
questions arise when applying encryption schemes to WSNs 
like, how the keys are generated or disseminated. How the 
keys are managed, revoked, assigned to a new sensor added to 
the network or renewed for ensuring robust security for the 
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network. As minimal (or no) human interaction for the sensors, 
is a fundamental feature of wireless sensor networks, it 
becomes an important issue how the keys could be modified 
time to time for encryption. Adoption of pre-loaded keys or 
embedded keys could not be an efficient solution. 
  
2.2. Steganography 
 
   While cryptography aims at hiding the content of a message, 
steganography [11], [12] aims at hiding the existence of the 
message. Steganography is the art of covert communication by 
embedding a message into the multimedia data (image, sound, 
video, etc.) [13]. The main objective of steganography is to 
modify the carrier in a way that is not perceptible and hence, it 
looks just like ordinary. It hides the existence of the covert 
channel, and furthermore, in the case that we want to send a 
secret data without sender information or when we want to 
distribute secret data publicly, it is very useful. However, 
securing wireless sensor networks is not directly related to 
steganography and processing multimedia data (like audio, 
video) with the inadequate resources [14] of the sensors is 
difficult and an open research issue. 
 
2.3 Physical Layer Secure Access 
 
   Physical layer secure access in wireless sensor networks 
could be provided by using frequency hopping. A dynamic 
combination of the parameters like hopping set (available 
frequencies for hopping), dwell time (time interval per hop) 
and hopping pattern (the sequence in which the frequencies 
from the available hopping set is used) could be used with a 
little expense of memory, processing and energy resources. 
Important points in physical layer secure access are the 
efficient design so that the hopping sequence is modified in 
less time than is required to discover it and for employing this 
both the sender and receiver should maintain a synchronized 
clock. A scheme as proposed in [15] could also be utilized 
which introduces secure physical layer access employing the 
singular vectors with the channel synthesized modulation. 
 
3. Security Threats and Issues in Wireless Sensor 
Networks 
 
   Most of the threats and attacks against security in wireless 
networks are almost similar to their wired counterparts while 
some are exacerbated with the inclusion of wireless 
connectivity. In fact, wireless networks are usually more 
vulnerable to various security threats as the unguided 
transmission medium is more susceptible to security attacks 
than those of the guided transmission medium. The broadcast 
nature of the wireless communication is a simple candidate for 
eavesdropping. In most of the cases various security issues and 
threats related to those we consider for wireless ad hoc 
networks are also applicable for wireless sensor networks. 
These issues are well-enumerated in some past researches [16], 
[17], [18] and also a number of security schemes are already 
been proposed to fight against them. However, the security 
mechanisms devised for wireless ad hoc networks could not be 
applied directly for wireless sensor networks because of the 
architectural disparity of the two networks. While ad hoc 
networks are self-organizing, dynamic topology, peer to peer 
networks formed by a collection of mobile nodes and the 
centralized entity is absent [19]; the wireless sensor networks 
could have a command node or a base station (centralized 
entity, sometimes termed as sink).   
   The architectural aspect of wireless sensor network could 
make the employment of a security schemes little bit easier as 
the base stations or the centralized entities could be used 
extensively in this case. Nevertheless, the major challenge is 
induced by the constraint of resources of the tiny sensors. In 
many cases, sensors are expected to be deployed arbitrarily in 
the enemy territory (especially in military reconnaissance 
scenario) or over dangerous or hazardous areas. Therefore, 
even if the base station (sink) resides in the friendly or safe 
area, the sensor nodes need to be protected from being 
compromised.  
 
3.1. Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks 
 
   Attacks against wireless sensor networks could be broadly 
considered from two different levels of views. One is the 
attack against the security mechanisms and another is against 
the basic mechanisms (like routing mechanisms). Here we 
point out the major attacks in wireless sensor networks. 
 
3.1.1 Denial of Service 
   Denial of Service (DoS) [20], [21] is produced by the 
unintentional failure of nodes or malicious action. The 
simplest DoS attack tries to exhaust the resources available to 
the victim node, by sending extra unnecessary packets and 
thus prevents legitimate network users from accessing services 
or resources to which they are entitled. DoS attack is meant not 
only for the adversary’s attempt to subvert, disrupt, or destroy 
a network, but also for any event that diminishes a network’s 
capability to provide a service. In wireless sensor networks, 
several types of DoS attacks in different layers might be 
performed. At physical layer the DoS attacks could be 
jamming and tampering, at link layer, collision, exhaustion, 
unfairness, at network layer, neglect and greed, homing, 
misdirection, black holes and at transport layer this attack 
could be performed by malicious flooding and 
desynchronization. The mechanisms to prevent DoS attacks 
include payment for network resources, pushback, strong 
authentication and identification of traffic. 
 
3.1.2 Attacks on Information in transit 
   In a sensor network, sensors monitor the changes of specific 
parameters or values and report to the sink according to the 
requirement. While sending the report, the information in 
transit may be altered, spoofed, replayed again or vanished. As 
wireless communication is vulnerable to eavesdropping, any 
attacker can monitor the traffic flow and get into action to 
interrupt, intercept, modify or fabricate [22] packets thus, 
provide wrong information to the base stations or sinks. As 
sensor nodes typically have short range of transmission and 
scarce resource, an attacker with high processing power and 
larger communication range could attack several sensors at the 
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same time to modify the actual information during 
transmission.  
 
3.1.3 Sybil Attack 
   In many cases, the sensors in a wireless sensor network 
might need to work together to accomplish a task, hence they 
can use distribution of subtasks and redundancy of 
information. In such a situation, a node can pretend to be more 
than one node using the identities of other legitimate nodes 
(Figure 1). This type of attack where a node forges the 
identities of more than one node is the Sybil attack [23], [24]. 
Sybil attack tries to degrade the integrity of data, security and 
resource utilization that the distributed algorithm attempts to 
achieve. Sybil attack can be performed for attacking the 
distributed storage, routing mechanism, data aggregation, 
voting, fair resource allocation and misbehavior detection [24]. 
Basically, any peer-to-peer network (especially wireless ad 
hoc networks) is vulnerable to sybil attack. However, as 
WSNs can have some sort of base stations or gateways, this 
attack could be prevented using efficient protocols. Douceur 
[23] showed that, without a logically centralized authority, 
sybil attacks are always possible except under extreme and 
unrealistic assumptions of resource parity and coordination 
among entities. However, detection of sybil nodes in a 
network is not so easy. Newsome et. al. [24] used radio 
resource testing to detect the presence of sybil node(s) in 
sensor network and showed that the probability to detect the 
existence of a sybil node is: 
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Where, n is the number of nodes in a neighbor set, s is the 
number of sybil nodes, m malicious nodes, g number of good 
nodes, c is the number of nodes that can be tested at a time by a 
node, of which S are sybil nodes, M are malicious (faulty) 
nodes, G are good (correct) nodes and r is the number of 
rounds to iterate the test. 
 
Figure 1: Sybil Attack 
 
3.1.4 Blackhole/Sinkhole Attack 
   In this attack, a malicious node acts as a blackhole [25] to 
attract all the traffic in the sensor network. Especially in a 
flooding based protocol, the attacker listens to requests for 
routes then replies to the target nodes that it contains the high 
quality or shortest path to the base station. Once the malicious 
device has been able to insert itself between the 
communicating nodes (for example, sink and sensor node), it 
is able to do anything with the packets passing between them. 
In fact, this attack can affect even the nodes those are 
considerably far from the base stations. Figure 2 shows the 
conceptual view of a blackhole/sinkhole attack. 
 
Figure 2: Conceptual view of Blackhole Attack 
 
3.1.5 Hello Flood Attack 
   Hello Flood Attack is introduced in [26]. This attack uses 
HELLO packets as a weapon to convince the sensors in WSN. 
In this sort of attack an attacker with a high radio transmission 
(termed as a laptop-class attacker in [26]) range and 
processing power sends HELLO packets to a number of sensor 
nodes which are dispersed in a large area within a WSN. The 
sensors are thus persuaded that the adversary is their neighbor. 
As a consequence, while sending the information to the base 
station, the victim nodes try to go through the attacker as they 
know that it is their neighbor and are ultimately spoofed by the 
attacker. 
 
3.1.7 Wormhole Attack 
   Wormhole attack [27] is a critical attack in which the 
attacker records the packets (or bits) at one location in the 
network and tunnels those to another location. The tunneling 
or retransmitting of bits could be done selectively. Wormhole 
attack is a significant threat to wireless sensor networks, 
because; this sort of attack does not require compromising a 
sensor in the network rather, it could be performed even at the 
initial phase when the sensors start to discover the neighboring 
information. 
 
                          (a)                                               (b) 
Figure 3: Wormhole Attack 
 
   Figure 3 (a and b) shows a situation where a wormhole 
attack takes place. When a node B (for example, the base 
station or any other sensor) broadcasts the routing request 
packet, the attacker receives this packet and replays it in its 
neighborhood. Each neighboring node receiving this replayed 
packet will consider itself to be in the range of Node B, and 
will mark this node as its parent. Hence, even if the victim 
nodes are multihop apart from B, attacker in this case 
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convinces them that B is only a single hop away from them, 
thus creates a wormhole. 
 
4. Proposed Security Schemes and Related Work 
 
   In the recent years, wireless sensor network security has 
been able to attract the attentions of a number of researchers 
around the world. In this section we review and map various 
security schemes proposed or implemented so far for wireless 
sensor networks. 
 
4.1. Security Schemes for Wireless Sensor Networks 
 
   [26] gives an analysis of secure routing in wireless sensor 
networks. [34] studies how to design secure distributed sensor 
networks with multiple supply voltages to reduce the energy 
consumption on computation and therefore to extend the 
network’s life time. [7] aims at increasing energy efficiency 
for key management in wireless sensor networks and uses 
Younis et. al. [36] network model for its application. Wood et 
al. [31] studies DoS attacks against different layers of sensor 
protocol stack. JAM [38] presents a mapping protocol which 
detects a jammed region in the sensor network and helps to 
avoid the faulty region to continue routing within the network, 
thus handles DoS attacks caused by jamming.     
 
 
   In [39] the authors show that wormholes those are so far 
considered harmful for WSN could effectively be used as a 
reactive defense mechanism for preventing jamming DoS 
attacks. Ye et. al. [33] presents a statistical en-route filtering 
(SEF) mechanism to detect injected false data in sensor 
network and focus mainly on how to filter false data using 
collective secret and thus preventing any single compromised 
node from breaking the entire system. SNEP & µTESLA [6] 
are two secure building blocks for providing data 
confidentiality, data freshness and broadcast authentication. 
TinySec [35] proposes a link layer security mechanism for 
sensor networks which uses an efficient symmetric key 
encryption protocol. 
   Newsome et. al. [24] proposes some defense mechanisms 
against sybil attack in sensor networks. Kulkarni et al. [28] 
analyzes the problem of assigning initial secrets to users in 
ad-hoc sensor networks to ensure authentication and privacy 
during their communication and points out possible ways of 
sharing the secrets. [40] presents a probabilistic secret sharing 
protocol to defend Hello flood attacks. The scheme uses a 
bidirectional verification technique and also introduces 
multi-path multi-base station routing if bidirectional 
verification is not sufficient to defend the attack.  
 
 
 
 
Security Schemes Attacks Deterred Network Architecture Major Features 
JAM [38] DoS Attack (Jamming) Traditional wireless sensor network Avoidance of jammed region by using coalesced neighbor nodes 
Wormhole based [39] DoS Attack (Jamming) Hybrid (mainly wireless partly wired) sensor network Uses wormholes to avoid jamming 
Statistical En-Route 
Filtering [33] Information Spoofing 
Large number of sensors, 
highly dense wireless sensor 
network 
Detects and drops false reports during forwarding process 
Radio Resource Testing, 
Random Key 
Pre-distribution etc. [24]  
Sybil Attack Traditional wireless sensor network 
Uses radio resource, Random key pre-distribution, Registration 
procedure, Position verification and Code attestation for 
detecting sybil entity 
Bidirectional Verification, 
Multi-path multi-base 
station routing [40] 
Hello Flood Attack Traditional wireless sensor network 
Adopts probabilistic secret sharing, Uses bidirectional 
verification and multi-path multi-base station routing  
On Communication 
Security [32] 
Information or Data 
Spoofing 
Traditional wireless sensor 
network 
Efficient resource management, Protects the network even if part 
of the network is compromised 
TIK [27] 
Wormhole Attack, 
Information or 
 Data Spoofing 
Traditional wireless sensor 
network 
Based on symmetric cryptography, Requires accurate time 
synchronization between all communicating parties, implements 
temporal leashes 
Random Key 
Predistribution [29], [30], 
[41] 
Data and information 
spoofing, Attacks in 
information in Transit 
Traditional wireless sensor 
network 
Provide resilience of the network, Protect the network even if 
part of the network is compromised, Provide authentication 
measures for sensor nodes 
[42] Data and Information Spoofing 
Distributed Sensor Network, 
Large-scale wireless sensor 
network with dynamic 
nature 
Suitable for large wireless sensor networks which allows 
addition and deletion of sensors, Resilient to sensor node capture 
REWARD [43] Blackhole attacks Traditional wireless sensor network 
Uses geographic routing,  Takes advantage of the broadcast 
inter-radio behavior to watch neighbor transmissions and detect 
blackhole attacks 
TinySec [35] 
Data and Information 
spoofing, Message 
Replay Attack 
Traditional wireless sensor 
network 
Focuses on providing message authenticity, integrity and 
confidentiality, Works in the link layer 
SNEP & µTESLA [6] 
Data and Information 
Spoofing, Message 
Replay Attacks 
Traditional wireless sensor 
network 
Semantic security, Data authentication, Replay protection, Weak 
freshness, Low communication overhead 
Table 1: Summary of various security schemes for wireless sensor networks 
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   REWARD [43] is a routing algorithm which fights against 
blackholes in the network. [32] proposes separate security 
schemes for data with various sensitivity levels and a 
location-based scheme for wireless sensor networks that 
protects the rest of the network, even when parts of the 
network are compromised. [27] implements symmetric key 
cryptographic algorithms with  delayed key disclosure on 
motes to establish secure communication channels between a 
base station and sensors within its range. [41], [42], [29] and 
[30] propose key pre-distribution schemes, which target to 
improve the resilience of the network. In Table 1 we 
summarize various security schemes along with their main 
properties proposed so far for wireless sensor networks. 
 
4.2. Holistic Security in Wireless Sensor Networks 
 
   A holistic approach [37] aims at improving the performance 
of wireless sensor networks with respect to security, longevity 
and connectivity under changing environmental conditions. 
The holistic approach of security concerns about involving all 
the layers for ensuring overall security in a network. For such a 
network, a single security solution for a single layer might not 
be an efficient solution rather employing a holistic approach 
could be the best option.  
 
Figure 4: Holistic view of Security in wireless sensor networks 
 
   The holistic approach has some basic principles like, in a 
given network; security is to be ensured for all the layers of the 
protocol stack, the cost for ensuring security should not 
surpass the assessed security risk at a specific time, if there is 
no physical security ensured for the sensors, the security 
measures must be able to exhibit a graceful degradation if 
some of the sensors in the network are compromised, out of 
order or captured by the enemy and the security measures 
should be developed to work in a decentralized fashion. If 
security is not considered for all of the security layers, for 
example; if a sensor is somehow captured or jammed in the 
physical layer, the security for the overall network breaks 
despite the fact that, there are some efficient security 
mechanisms working in other layers. By building security 
layers as in the holistic approach, protection could be 
established for the overall network. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
   Most of the attacks against security in wireless sensor 
networks are caused by the insertion of false information by 
the compromised nodes within the network. For defending the 
inclusion of false reports by compromised nodes, a means is 
required for detecting false reports. However, developing such 
a detection mechanism and making it efficient represents a 
great research challenge. Again, ensuring holistic security in 
wireless sensor network is a major research issue. Many of 
today’s proposed security schemes are based on specific 
network models. As there is a lack of combined effort to take a 
common model to ensure security for each layer, in future 
though the security mechanisms become well-established for 
each individual layer, combining all the mechanisms together 
for making them work in collaboration with each other will 
incur a hard research challenge. Even if holistic security could 
be ensured for wireless sensor networks, the cost-effectiveness 
and energy efficiency to employ such mechanisms could still 
pose great research challenge in the coming days. 
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